SafeWave Space Systems / Satellite / Orbital Infrastructure Follow-Up Questionnaire

High-consequence follow-up for satellites, orbital platforms, spacecraft autonomy, ground-station workflows, space communications, remote sensing, space-domain awareness, launch-support systems, and space-linked defense or infrastructure environments.

Follow-up Questionnaire Notice

You may preview or complete this follow-up before, after, or without completing the core SafeWave questionnaire. Opening or completing it does not transmit information or begin an engagement.

If you want this follow-up included in a SafeWave assessment, complete the core questionnaire and use the same Assessment Reference ID or generic system label. The answers may then be used to generate a separate High-Consequence Addendum. This follow-up supplements the core assessment; it does not replace it.

Confidentiality, Anonymity & Use Notice

We recognize that this questionnaire may involve confidential, security-sensitive, operationally sensitive, or high-consequence system information. SafeWave does not require classified information, credentials, live vulnerability details, controlled data, proprietary implementation details, customer data, or other highly sensitive material. Do not submit such information through this questionnaire. Use anonymized descriptions, generic labels, hypothetical scenarios, or composite systems instead.

You may complete and download this questionnaire without providing your name or identifying your employer, organization, model, system, project, or deployment. No personal or work email address is required.

Your responses are saved only in this browser on this device. Generating or downloading a completed follow-up does not send it to SafeWave or any third party. Information reaches SafeWave only if you deliberately send the completed document.

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The questions are useful as a private self-assessment. They may expose overlooked critical assumptions, interacting risk pathways, unclear authority or ownership, missing evidence, unstable behavior, undefined operating boundaries, or inadequate recovery conditions. If an implementation detail is unknown, select Unknown / not evaluated rather than guessing.

If you request a report, you may use a separate, non-identifying return address. SafeWave will not use that address for promotional contact unless you expressly request further communication. You may also request that the report use neutral functional terminology rather than SafeWave architecture names.

Completing this questionnaire does not create a finding, admission, engagement, compliance determination, certification, or implementation obligation. Using the questionnaire, sending information, requesting a report, and entering any later customer or partnership discussion are separate decisions under your control.

Any resulting SafeWave recommendations are architectural guidance and implementation requirements, not a claim that one generic solution can be inserted into every system. Engineering teams may implement equivalent controls themselves or use SafeWave mappings and Engineering Packs to support further implementation work.

SafeWave provides the assessment because helping make advanced AI safer for humanity is central to our mission. If you find it valuable, you may later choose to work with SafeWave, but there is no obligation.

If an implementation detail is not known, select Unknown / not evaluated rather than guessing.

Answer based on actual or currently planned system behavior, not ideal policy language.

Assessment Linkage

If you want this follow-up to be matched to a previously completed main questionnaire, use the same system label, contact email, or assessment reference ID. You may use generic identifiers if confidentiality is a concern.

Name (optional)

Email for matching or report delivery (optional — generic email may be used)

Company / organization (optional — generic label may be used)

System / business unit label (generic label may be used)

Assessment reference ID (optional)

To connect this follow-up to a main questionnaire, use the same system label, email, or assessment reference ID across forms. You may use generic identifiers if confidentiality is a concern.

Space Systems / Satellite / Orbital Infrastructure

Space Systems / Satellite / Orbital Infrastructure Questions

These questions evaluate higher-consequence space-system risks involving orbital autonomy, satellite fleet operations, ground-station control, command-link integrity, degraded communications, space-domain awareness, remote sensing, launch-support workflows, cyber-physical compromise, cross-system dependencies, recovery limits, and mission-continuity boundaries.

SS.3 Can system outputs materially influence orbital behavior, satellite tasking, ground-station activity, communications routing, launch-support activity, or space-linked operational decisions?

Single choice

SS.4 Is there a clear separation between space-system recommendation, command preparation, and executable command authority?

Examples include separation between analysis, tasking recommendation, maneuver planning, uplink approval, payload scheduling, communications routing, and executed spacecraft or ground-segment action.

Single choice

SS.5 Can the system initiate, approve, schedule, transmit, modify, prioritize, or automate commands affecting satellites, spacecraft, payloads, ground stations, or space-linked infrastructure?

Single choice

SS.6 Are authorized orbital assets, payloads, ground stations, regions, frequency bands, missions, customers, and command types explicitly defined before space-system action occurs?

Single choice

SS.7 Can the system affect spacecraft maneuvering, station keeping, deorbit behavior, collision avoidance, payload orientation, sensor tasking, or communication availability?

Single choice

SS.8 Are command authority, mission planning, payload control, telemetry processing, ground-station access, and external integrations separated with enforced boundaries?

Single choice

SS.9 Could a defect, corrupted update, shared model error, compromised command path, or telemetry fault cause synchronized unsafe behavior across multiple satellites, ground stations, or mission systems?

Single choice

No synchronized risk pathway Limited synchronized risk Moderate synchronized risk High constellation or multi-system synchronized risk Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.10 Are constellation-level, ground-segment, and mission-system cascade pathways explicitly mapped, bounded, and tested?

Single choice

SS.11 Can failure in this system affect multiple dependent sectors such as communications, defense, navigation, weather, emergency response, finance, transportation, logistics, or critical infrastructure?

Single choice

SS.12 Can the system continue operating safely under degraded telemetry, command-link delay, communications loss, ground-station outage, GPS/GNSS disruption, sensor degradation, power limits, thermal stress, radiation effects, or partial system failure?

Single choice

SS.13 Are fail-safe, fail-operational, fallback, autonomous safe-mode, manual-control, or degraded-mission modes explicitly defined?

Single choice

SS.14 Can operators manually override, isolate, slow, pause, degrade, recover, or safe-mode space-system actions if behavior moves outside intended boundaries?

Single choice

Yes, reliable manual control exists Mostly reliable Partially reliable Manual intervention may be difficult under stress or latency No clear manual recovery pathway Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.15 Are emergency lockout, command inhibition, quarantine, rollback, safe-mode, or no-uplink/no-execute mechanisms available for space-system actions?

Single choice

SS.16 Are restoration, rollback, failover, rekeying, ground-station reassignment, constellation recovery, and mission-continuity procedures defined and tested?

Single choice

SS.17 Can automated actions cause mission loss, service denial, communications disruption, unsafe orbital behavior, sensor misdirection, data loss, public-service impact, or defense/dual-use escalation?

Single choice

SS.18 Are human authorization requirements defined before high-impact space-system changes occur?

Examples include maneuver commands, payload retasking, deorbit actions, collision-avoidance changes, encryption/key changes, customer-priority changes, communications rerouting, or emergency command authority.

Single choice

SS.19 Are human reviewers able to realistically understand, evaluate, approve, or reject space-system actions at the required speed, latency, uncertainty, and mission complexity?

Single choice

SS.20 Can emergency conditions, contested-space conditions, operator overload, communications delay, mission pressure, commercial pressure, or defense urgency expand system authority without independent review?

Single choice

No Only through formal independent review Possible under limited conditions Yes, expansion can occur without meaningful review Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.21 Are space-system safeguards, orbital limits, command rules, payload constraints, routing rules, escalation boundaries, and emergency authorities protected from post-deployment modification without independent authorization and audit?

Single choice

Yes, independent authorization and audit are required Mostly protected Partially protected Possible under some operational conditions Safeguards can be changed without independent review Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.22 Are model, ruleset, playbook, command-policy, ground-segment, vendor, firmware, flight-software, or configuration updates blocked until space-system risk controls are revalidated?

Single choice

SS.23 Could scaling, constellation expansion, integration expansion, customer configuration, vendor change, model update, autonomy increase, or permission expansion materially increase space-system risk?

Single choice

SS.24 Can the system operate across multiple satellites, ground stations, customers, missions, vendors, regions, jurisdictions, frequency bands, or service providers?

Single choice

No Limited single-asset or single-environment operation Multi-asset operation with strict separation Multi-region or multi-provider operation with partial controls Broad cross-environment operation possible Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.25 Are asset, mission, customer, jurisdiction, frequency, ground-station, and provider boundaries enforced so actions cannot cross scope unintentionally?

Single choice

SS.26 Can the system depend on concentrated launch providers, satellite vendors, ground-station networks, cloud providers, identity providers, update channels, firmware suppliers, data processors, or external APIs whose failure could disrupt space-system operation?

Single choice

SS.27 Are vendor, cloud, ground-segment, software, firmware, flight-software, model, and supply-chain dependencies protected with provenance, redundancy, failover, tamper evidence, and incident response?

Single choice

SS.28 Can compromised credentials, insider action, vendor access, OTA/update compromise, command-channel manipulation, telemetry manipulation, or external integration cause space-system-impacting changes?

Single choice

SS.29 Are identity, privilege, operator, contractor, vendor, machine-account, ground-station, and command-signing permissions bounded and monitored across space-system-impacting systems?

Single choice

SS.30 Does the system operate in adversarial, contested, or strategically sensitive environments where attackers may attempt command spoofing, jamming, telemetry manipulation, data poisoning, ground-station compromise, credential compromise, or workflow hijacking?

Single choice

SS.31 Are space-system inputs, telemetry, orbital data, threat alerts, ground-station data, sensor data, mission tickets, logs, and external commands treated as potentially adversarial or degraded?

Single choice

SS.32 Are space-system decisions, recommendations, commands, overrides, configuration changes, operator approvals, authorization events, and emergency decisions logged in a tamper-evident and attributable way?

Single choice

SS.33 Can space-system outcomes be traced back to inputs, model outputs, operator approvals, tool calls, rules, authority boundaries, safeguards, runtime limits, and command provenance?

Single choice

SS.34 Is monitoring sufficient to detect unsafe escalation, command-scope failure, service degradation, cross-asset propagation, unauthorized changes, dependency failure, telemetry manipulation, or degraded control?

Single choice

SS.35 Are space-system incidents, near-misses, command anomalies, automation failures, mission deviations, emergency overrides, and recovery actions independently reviewed?

Single choice

SS.36 Are non-negotiable stop conditions defined where space-system-impacting automation must halt rather than proceed?

Examples include unclear authority, contested command channel, telemetry uncertainty, cyber compromise, ground-station uncertainty, collision-risk uncertainty, loss of monitoring, unsafe mission retasking, or rollback failure.

Single choice

SS.38 Should this assessment also include the Cybersecurity / Cyber Operations follow-up questionnaire?

Select “Yes” if cyber compromise, command-channel manipulation, credential abuse, vendor access, cloud dependency, telemetry manipulation, ground-station compromise, OTA/update compromise, or adversarial control could materially affect this space system.

Single choice

Yes — cybersecurity follow-up should also be completed Possibly — further review is needed No — space-system questions are sufficient for this case Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.39 Should this assessment also include the Critical Infrastructure follow-up questionnaire?

Select “Yes” if this system materially supports communications, navigation, emergency response, defense, energy, transportation, finance, logistics, weather, healthcare, public services, or other essential infrastructure.

Single choice

Yes — critical infrastructure follow-up should also be completed Possibly — further review is needed No — space-system questions are sufficient for this case Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.40 Are conjunction assessment, collision-risk screening, and close-approach alerts integrated into operational decision-making?

Examples include screenings against known objects, protected assets, orbital debris, constellation neighbors, and high-priority operator alerts.

Single choice

Yes, integrated and continuously monitored Mostly integrated Partially integrated Manual or ad hoc review only No clear conjunction-assessment integration Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.41 Can the system autonomously or semi-autonomously initiate collision-avoidance maneuvers?

Single choice

No autonomous maneuver authority Only with explicit human authorization Yes, within strict maneuver boundaries Yes, with partial or adaptive boundaries Yes, broad autonomous maneuver authority exists Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.42 Are collision-avoidance maneuvers bounded by fuel budget, mission impact, orbital-slot constraints, debris-risk tradeoffs, and coordination requirements?

Single choice

SS.43 Does the system coordinate collision-avoidance decisions with other operators, space-traffic-management services, space situational awareness providers, or government tracking sources?

Single choice

Yes, coordination pathways are defined and tested Mostly defined Partially defined Ad hoc coordination only No clear external coordination pathway Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.44 How does the system behave when tracking data, ephemeris data, conjunction messages, timing, or object identity is uncertain or conflicting?

Single choice

Fails into conservative collision-risk handling Mostly conservative handling Partial uncertainty handling May continue nominal operations under uncertainty No clear uncertainty-handling model Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.45 Could a software fault, corrupted update, autonomy error, cyber compromise, operator error, or misleading tracking input cause maneuvers that increase collision, conjunction, orbital-slot, or debris risk?

Single choice

No credible pathway Limited pathway with strong safeguards Moderate pathway under partial controls Significant pathway Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.46 Are fragmentation, debris-generation, breakup, collision-cascade, or long-term orbital-sustainability scenarios modeled and tabletop-tested?

Single choice

SS.47 Are end-of-life disposal, deorbit, passivation, graveyard-orbit transfer, or mission-extension decisions bounded by verified execution controls?

Single choice

SS.49 Are there space-system, satellite, orbital, ground-station, space-domain awareness, remote-sensing, launch-support, defense, communications, or space-linked infrastructure risks not captured above?

Open response

SS.50 — Command-Authority Compression Boundary: Can latency, communications loss, orbital timing pressure, contested-space conditions, emergency mission pressure, operator overload, or automation speed compress human review before a space-system-impacting command or action occurs?

Single choice

No — human review remains enforceable under compressed conditions Limited compression possible Moderate compression possible under some conditions Significant compression or bypass risk Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.51 — Orbital / Mission Action Boundary: Can the system initiate or materially influence orbital maneuvering, payload tasking, communication routing, sensor direction, emergency mode, collision-avoidance behavior, or mission-critical service allocation before mission scope, authority, telemetry integrity, and rollback/safe-mode conditions are verified?

Single choice

No — conditions are verified before mission-impacting action Limited pathway with strong safeguards Moderate pathway under partial controls Significant pathway before full verification Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.52 — Load-Bearing Assumptions: Before a mission-impacting command, autonomous maneuver, payload action, capability update, deployment, or authority expansion occurs, are the specific assumptions on which its safety and authorization depend explicitly identified?

SS.52–54 apply SafeAssumption / Critical Assumption Integrity to space-system and mission-impacting workflows.

Single choice

Yes — all load-bearing assumptions are explicitly identified and linked to dependent actions Mostly — major assumptions are identified, but some dependencies remain implicit Partially — assumptions are considered informally or inconsistently No — actions may proceed without identifying their load-bearing assumptions Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.53 — Consequence-Proportionate Evidence: Is each load-bearing assumption supported by independent, current, context-relevant evidence whose strength is proportionate to the possible severity and irreversibility of orbital, mission, physical, or cross-sector harm?

Single choice

Yes — evidence requirements increase with consequence and are independently verified Mostly — evidence is generally proportionate, with limited gaps Partially — some evidence exists, but it is not consistently proportionate or independent No — plausible or model-generated claims may be accepted without consequence-proportionate verification Unknown / not evaluated N/A

SS.54 — Assumption Revalidation and Dependent Revocation: If a load-bearing assumption becomes stale, contradicted, contextually invalid, or insufficiently supported, is every dependent command, maneuver, mission action, or authority automatically paused or withdrawn until the assumption is revalidated?

Single choice

Yes — dependent action and authority are automatically paused or withdrawn Mostly — automatic withdrawal applies to the highest-consequence dependencies Partially — alerts or human review occur, but dependent authority may continue No — dependent action or authority can continue after the assumption becomes unreliable Unknown / not evaluated N/A

Your completed follow-up will include the linkage fields above so this follow-up can be matched to the main questionnaire if you choose to share it for report generation.

Optional companion assessment

Space Mission Integrity & Autonomous Operations

For connected lunar or Mars missions, crewed stations and habitats, rovers and robotic arms, multi-agent autonomy, rendezvous, docking, and sample or crew return.

Explore mission-wide dependencies and interacting failure pathways beyond the individual satellite or orbital system. Thirty additional questions examine where one incorrect or unauthorized action could jeopardize an entire mission, which safeguards are required, and what evidence would establish they work.

View the Optional Space Mission Questionnaire ↗

Opens in a new tab. Publicly viewable; no registration or sensitive mission information required. The existing Space Systems questionnaire is unchanged.